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  Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.  Special thanks to Jeffrey Vernon for his
1
imaginative, thorough and insightful research assistance,  my  Columbia colleagues for their thoughtful observations in
two faculty colloquia and many conversations, and Profs. Trevor Morrison and Kevin Stack for their helpful comments.
  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2
  Compare Attorney General Wirt’s advice to President Monroe (his role is to give “general superintendence”
3
to those to whom Congress had assigned executive duties, as “it could never have been the intention of the constitution
... that he should in person execute the laws himself. ... [W]ere the President to perform [a statutory duty assigned to
another], he would not only not be taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he would be violating them
himself,” 1 Op. A.G. 624-625 (1823)), with Attorney General Cushing’s advice to President Buchanan (“no Head of
Department can lawfully perform an official act against the will of the President,” since a contrary view would permit
Congress so to “divide and transfer the executive power as utterly to subvert the Government,” albeit that “all the
ordinary business of administration” is, in statutory terms, placed under the authority of the Departments, not the
President, and “may be performed by its Head, without the special direction or appearance of the President.”  7 Op. A.G.
453, 469-70 (1855)).  The opinions, with helpful commentary, may be found in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL(1999); the story is also told in HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES:
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE ADM INISTRATIVE STATE 456-59  (2006).
  Constitution confers this authority: e.g., Steven Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power
4
to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L. J. 541 (1994); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, and Anthony Colangelo, The
(continued...)
-1-
Overseer, or “The Decider”?  The President in Administrative Law
Peter L. Strauss1
“The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day.  It does come, however slowly,
from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the
most disinterested assertion of authority.”2
All will agree that the Constitution creates a unitary chief executive officer, the President, at the
head of the government Congress defines to do the work its statutes detail.  Disagreement arises over
what his function entails.  Once Congress has defined some element of government and specified
its responsibilities, we know that the constitutional roles of both Congress and the courts are those
of oversight of the agency and its assigned work, not the actual performance of that work.  But is it
the same for the President?  When Congress confers authority on the Environmental Protection
Agency to regulate various forms of pollution, on the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
to regulate workplace safety, on the Food & Drug Administration to regulate the safety of food,
drugs and medical devices, etc., etc., is it in legal contemplation giving the President the authority
to decide these matters, or only to oversee them?  One might think this a fairly elementary question,
yet it is one that has divided Attorneys General from the beginning of the Republic  and that divides3
scholars still.   Conversations with many scholars over the years, and in the course of writing this4
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  (...continued)
4
Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 601 (2005); Constitution does not confer this
authority, but it should be presumed Congress intends it, given the realities of modern administration: e.g., Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001); Laurence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, the President and
the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994); the President, unless directly authorized, is only an overseer: e.g.,
Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 263 (2006); Peter L.
Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 965 (1997); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed:
Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 987 (1997).  
  N. 3 above.
5
  Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev.
6
47 (2006).
  The Yale Law Journal recently hosted a symposium issue on the question of executive authority generally,
7
that did not focus on the questions under discussion here.  The Most Dangerous Branch? Mayors, Governors, Presidents,
and the Rule of Law: A Symposium on Executive Power, 115 Yale L. J. No. 9, Sept. 2006.  A notable exception was
an essay by Professor Cass Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L.J.
2580 (2006), arguing that the President’s participation in law interpretation gave the Court’s decision in Chevron, Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), special force.  Some of the arguments made in this
essay appear informally in my debate with Professor Sunstein in the Law Journal’s Pocket Part.  Peter L. Strauss, Within
Marbury: The Importance of Judicial Limits on the Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, et seq., 116 Yale L.J.
Pocket Part 59, 77, 81 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/content/view/63/.  It is not hard to draw from the Journal issue
generally the conclusion that a strong unitary executive is far from a necessary condition of effective governance, and
often enough a threat to democratic values.
-2-
essay, have been marked with confusion over the difference between oversight and performance.
In a recent, encyclopedic study of separation of powers,  Harold Bruff, long a leading scholar of the5
field, reveals the debates without seeking clearly to resolve them; Lisa Bressman and Michael
Vandenbergh, in a ground-breaking account of the EPA-White House interface from the perspective
of EPA political appointees (both Republican and Democrat),  refer repeatedly to “presidential6
control” without being explicit whether their EPA correspondents viewed what they heard as
political guidance (however emphatic) or binding instructions.  Does it deny the unitary characteristic
of the American presidency to suggest that in relation to the general concerns of administrative law,
and absent actual congressional delegation of decisional authority to the President, his role is limited
to executive oversight of the agency on whom that authority is statutorily conferred?  7
Madison and Hamilton, writing about federalism and the judiciary respectively in the Federalist
Papers, remarked in striking similar terms on their expectations that the course of events would
shape answers to questions a brief text could not determine.
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and
most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and
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  The Federalist No. 37 (Madison)[6th (long) para].
8
  The Federalist No. 82 (Hamilton) [1  para.]st
9
  This was the burden of the well-publicized memorandum written by Justice Alito as a young attorney in the
10
Office of Legal Counsel in the first years of the Reagan administration, [cite]
  126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
11
  Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U. S. T.
12
3316, T. I. A. S. No. 3364 (Third Geneva Convention).





‘Tis time only that can mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning
of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE.9
One could have said with confidence that the course of history over our nation’s first two centuries
had produced an understanding of the President’s role, in relation to ordinary administration, as
overseer and not decider.  The last quarter century has seen an unmistakable trend, however, to a
stronger White House role – corresponding in part to intellectual trends highlighting the roles of
politics over those of “law” or “expertise” in relation to administrative work, in part to the challenges
of an increasingly large and important administrative rulemaking apparatus, and in part to a self-
conscious political agenda to “return” strength to a presidency weakened by Watergate and political
reactions to the war in Viet Nam.10
The trend would be enough to warrant making this question the subject of this first Foreword to
the planned annual Administrative Law number of this law review.  Recent developments give it
added force.  Two Supreme Court decisions essentially bracketing the Term just ended address the
legality of presidential decision, one directly and one by strong implication.  In Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,  decided on the final day of Term, the Court repudiated by the narrowest of margins the11
President’s claim that his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, taken together with
vaguely worded statutes, empowered him to create tribunals with life-and-death authority over non-
citizen detainees, operating procedurally and substantively outside the frameworks established by
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the United States’ obligations under the Third Geneva
Convention (concerning the treatment of prisoners of war).   In one of the first decisions of the12
Term, Gonzales v. Oregon,  it was required to assess the legal effect of an opinion of the Attorney13
General – that official on whose judgment about the law presidential interpretations might most often
rest, and who claims for his judgments the government-wide legal authority we are exploring for the
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  Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000)).
14
  OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-.813 (2005).
15
  In the foreign relations and military command, settings we are not accustomed to thinking that the exercise
16
of executive authority results in actions subject to judicial review;  rather, it constitutes the exercise of discretion in its
largest sense, essentially political questions and unchecked by law.  See TAN 35 below.
  Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 965 (1997).  Dean Kagan of Harvard Law
17
School subsequently confirmed, and celebrated, this phenomenon.  Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv.
L. Rev. 2245 (2001); and see Bressman & Vandenbergh, n. ? above.
  News stories quoting Sec. Thompson of HHS, early in the first Bush administration.
18
-4-
President – interpreting the Controlled Substances Act  to render felonious a physician’s14
prescription of morphine to help her patient end her life, even though that prescription was made in
full conformity with the procedures of Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act.   The opinion, in the form15
of instructions to federal prosecutors, had been rendered without public consultation of any kind,
countermanded a predecessor’s earlier contrary interpretation, ignored the role of the Department
of Health and Human Services in matters concerned with federal regulation of the medical profession
and profession-relevant aspects of the Controlled Substances Act, and in effect created a new federal
crime.  Five Justices of the current Court, plus Justice O’Connor, found it without authority; the
remaining three Justices sitting – all joiners also of the Hamdan dissents and enthusiasts for
executive authority – dissented, concluding that it was entitled to control. 
Like Hamdan, the current debates often turn around presidential initiatives associated with  the
“war on terror,” or, more narrowly, the use of military forces in, and treatment of detainees from,
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Evoking the President’s authority as Commander in Chief and the unusual
breadth of his authority over the nation’s foreign affairs, these issues are not my concern here.   But16
the debates also include  the recent contretemps in the newspapers, the blogosphere, and even the
American Bar Association, over presidential use of signing statements rather than vetoes to express
concerns and understandings about legislation Congress had presented for approval.  If these are
simply statements, one might wonder why anyone would be troubled about them.  If on the other
hand they have some legal force, one can perhaps find in them “the accretion of dangerous power,”
departures from the marvelous system of checks and balances that has so long kept American
government on the rails.  Our last Presidents, if not their predecessors, seem to have been at pains
to convey the impression that they are personally responsible for the conduct of domestic
governance, to a degree that extends to the resolution or decision of particular administrative
issues;  and their cabinet officials sometimes speak as if they were following binding presidential17
orders, rather than exercising their own statutory powers.   These developments, too, are our18
concern.  Scholars such as Chicago’s Professor Cass Sunstein and Harvard’s Dean Elena Kagan have
argued that although, in their judgment, the Constitution does not compel these developments, the
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  Op. cit. n. 4 above.
19
  Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations 1787-1801 115 YALE
20
L.J. 1256 (2006) 
  Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 263 (2006);
21
see also Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073
(2005).
  “The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States ...,” U.S. Const. Art. II, §1, cl. 1.
22
  U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Art. II , § 2, cl. 1.
23
  “ ... [H]e may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
24
upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices,” U. S. Const. Art. II ., § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
  Id., § 3, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
25
  E.g., Attorney General Wirt, n. 3 above.
26
-5-
contemporary circumstances of government support them in the absence of explicit congressional
instructions to the contrary ; Professors Jerry Mashaw  and Kevin Stack , exploring Congress’s19 20 21
early practice and subsequent patterns, raise considerable doubts whether any presumption of
presidential empowerment (beyond what the Constitution requires) is warranted.
The Constitution itself is at best ambivalent on the question.  On the one hand, the opening words
of Article II  locate all executive power in the President, and the Philadelphia convention famously22
and emphatically rejected any idea of a collegial executive.  From the strongest perspective on what
it means to have a unitary chief executive, when Congress assigns a matter for decision to a
constituent element of the executive branch, it does so only for convenience – as a matter of
constitutional power, the President has the right to decide it.  On the other hand, the Constitution
twice refers to “duties” or “power” assigned to other officers;  Article II in terms gives the President23
only the right to seek from those officers a written opinion about their exercise of those duties (i.e.,
it does not say he may command their exercise of those assigned duties) ; and it concludes that he24
is responsible to see to it that the laws “be faithfully executed”  – i.e. as if by others.  From this25
perspective, as some (but not all) Attorneys General have concluded,  Congress’s creation of duties26
in others creates in the President a constitutional obligation to oversee and respect the independent
exercise of those duties.  On this view, just as he must respect a statutory framework that assigns care
for the national parks to the Department of the Interior, and care for the national forests to the
Department of Agriculture, he must act within a statutory framework that assigns actual decision-
making about particular issues affecting air quality to the EPA – subject to his (inevitably political)
oversight.  
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  Edward Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787–1957, 80–81 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
27
  Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
28
Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984); see also Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 965 (1997).
-6-
The difference between oversight and decision can be subtle, particularly when the important
transactions occur behind closed doors and among political compatriots who value loyalty and
understand that the President who selected the others is their democratically chosen leader.  Still
there is a difference between ordinary respect and political deference, on the one hand, and law-
compelled obedience, on the other; and the subordinate’s understanding which of these is owed, and
what is her personal responsibility, has implications for one’s hopes for a government under laws,
that motivate this writing.  I cannot improve on the characterization of the problem given half a
century ago by Prof. Corwin:
Suppose ... that the law casts a duty upon a subordinate executive agency eo nomine, does
the President thereupon become entitled, by virtue of his "executive power" or of his duty
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" to substitute his judgment for that of the
agency regarding the discharge of such duty?  An unqualified answer to this question would
invite startling results.  An affirmative answer would make all questions of law enforcement
questions of discretion, the discretion moreover of an independent and legally uncontrollable
branch of the government.  By the same token, it would render it impossible for Congress,
notwithstanding its broad powers under the "necessary and proper" clause, to leave anything
to the specially trained judgment of a subordinate executive official with any assurance that
his discretion would not be perverted to political ends for the advantage of the administration
in power.  At the same time, a flatly negative answer would hold out consequences equally
unwelcome.  It would, as Attorney General Cushing quaintly phrased it, leave it open to
Congress so to divide and transfer "the executive power" by statute as to change the govern-
ment "into a parliamentary despotism like that of Venezuela or Great Britain with a nominal
executive chief or president, who, however, would remain without a shred of actual power."27
As in earlier scholarship,  my own conclusion is that in ordinary administrative law contexts, where28
Congress has assigned a function to a named agency subject to its oversight and the discipline of
judicial review, the President’s role – like that of the Congress and the courts – is that of overseer
and not decider.  These oversight responsibilities, in my judgment, satisfy the undoubted
constitutional specification of a unitary chief executive, the President; and they avoid the executive
tyrrany horn of Corwin’s dilemma.
As, first, Attorney General and then as Acting Secretary of the Treasury and Supreme Court
nominee, Roger Taney would directly experience both the dilemma and the political consequences
that could flow from recognition that Congress might place decisional authority in other than
presidential hands.  His initial encounter came in a foreign relations setting, where one might
suppose presidential authority at a maximum.  The Princess of Orange wanted the return to her of
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  The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. A.G. 482, 489 (1831).  See also n. 31 infra.
29
  3 Stat. 266, §16 (April 10, 1816).
30
  Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History 1829-61, 37 (1954), quoted in
31
BRUFF, n. 3 above at 458. 
  White’s account reveals in detail Jackson’s acceptance of the proposition that his control lay over the office-
32
holder and was not a power of decision.    Id. at 35-39.  The same passages refer to the near-contemporaneous decision
of the Supreme Court in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524 (1838), in which the Court would remark
The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived from the constitution, he is
beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the
impeaching power.  But it by no means follows, that every officer in every branch of that department is under
the exclusive direction of the President.  Such a principle, we apprehend, is not, and certainly cannot be claimed
by the President.     
There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the discharge of
which is under the direction of the President.  But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose
upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and
protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the
control of the law, and not to the direction of the President.  And this is emphatically the case, where the duty
enjoined is of a mere ministerial character.
(continued...)
-7-
jewels stolen from her, that the United States was seeking to forfeit to itself in a customs action.  As
Attorney General, Taney advised President Andrew Jackson that he could lawfully direct a United
States Attorney to discontinue an existing forfeiture action, but acknowledged as well that “The
district attorney might refuse the President’s order; and if he did refuse, the prosecution, while he
remained in office, would go on.”   That is, the President would assure the faithful execution of the29
laws through removal of one who failed to follow his directions, rather than substitution of his own
decision.  
Shortly the issue recurred in more dramatic form.  Jackson had successfully vetoed a bill that
would have reauthorized the Bank of the United States; subsequently elected to his second term by
a wide margin, he asked his Secretary of the Treasury, Louis McLane, to remove the government’s
funds from the Bank and deposit them in state banks.  But the Bank’s authority ran  until 1836, and
the relevant statute provided that government funds were to be kept in it “unless the Secretary of the
Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct.”   When Secretary McLane decided against30
removing the funds, Jackson removed him and appointed William Duane as his successor.  Duane
also proved resistant, responding to Jackson’s persistent arguments that “In this particular case,
congress confers a discretionary power, and requires reasons if I exercise it.  Surely this contemplates
responsibility on my part.”   In September of 1833, when after lengthy and fervent correspondence31
between them Duane declined to remove the funds, Jackson removed him and appointed Taney
Acting Secretary; almost immediately, Taney made the requested order.   The result was a political32
Draft of December 5, 2006                                 Do not quote or cite without written permission
  (...continued)
32
At 610.  While Chief Justice Taney dissented from the opinion, he did so only on the basis of a statutory question not
related to this passage.  As Attorney General, he had issued an opinion treating the statutes conferring authority on
accounting officers in the Treasury Department as making their decision controlling, subject only to the President’s
removal power.  2 Opinions of the Attorney General 507, 509 (April 5, 1832).  And see White at 167-69.
  White at 44, 110.
33
  In their vigorous account of the same events, in the first installment of their four-part series, see n. 101 infra,
34
Christopher Yoo and Steven Calabresi, The Unitary Executive During the First Half Century, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
1451, 1537 ff. (1997), Professors Yoo and Calabresi appear to elide the distinction between presidential authority oneself
to take a decision assigned to another, and presidential authority to remove an officer who would not effectuate a desired
policy, a distinction that all participants in the events, including Taney, acknowledged and respected.  Compare White,
n. 30 above.
  343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
35
-8-
furor: the Senate passed a Resolution of Censure and subsequently rejected Taney’s nomination as
Secretary – the first time in American history it had rejected a presidential nomination to the cabinet.
When in 1835 President Jackson nominated Taney to a seat as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, that nomination, too, failed.  Changes in Senate membership permitted his renomination and
confirmation as Chief Justice months later, in 1836, and the eventual expungement of the Resolution
of Censure.   The President thus did prevail, but not without cost.33
The main point to note here is how recognition that the discretion involved lay with the Secretary
of the Treasury, not the President, gave the events high political visibility and animated the
machinery of checks and balances.   In more recent times, a not dissimilar series of events and34
highly politicized outcomes – with, again, two resignations from cabinet positions and two
reappointments before the President achieved his purposes – attended President Richard Nixon’s
effort to debarrass himself of special prosecutor Archibald Cox.  In this case, the President ultimately
did not prevail.  And it is in the detritus of this event, it appears, that a campaign to restrengthen the
presidency has taken root.
Fortuitously, perhaps, the courts have had few if any occasions to confront directly the question
of presidential decisional authority in conventional administrative law contexts.  Prominent
statements from outside the field suggest the problems.  Justice Hugo Black, who must have known
how frequently executive agencies adopt regulations (currently about ten times as often as Congress
enacts statutes), famously remarked in his majority opinion for the Court in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube v. Sawyer (a context that had nothing to do with presidential direction of rulemaking), that “the
President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker.”   Chief Justice Marshall’s famous Marbury v. Madison distinction between35
discretionary and non-discretionary acts of government – characterizing an official who performed
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  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803).  The full passage makes the limited target of Marshall’s
36
invocation of “discretion” the more evident:
[The Secretary of State, in administering foreign affairs] is to conform precisely to the will of the President.
He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated.  The act of such an officer, as an officer, can never
be examinable by the courts.  But when the legislature proceeds to [direct] ... that officer ... peremptorily to
perform certain acts [on which individual rights turn] ... he is so far the officer of the law ... and cannot, at his
discretion, sport away the rights of others.
... [W]here the heads of departments are ... to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or
legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. ...
The province of the courts is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive,
or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.  Questions in their nature political, or
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court. 
Id. At 166-170.
  272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
37
  “[G]eneral administrative control” (emphasis added) need not connote a right to substitute decision;
38
similarly, the phrase “supervise and guide” suggests a role conceived as oversight, rather than direct responsibility to
direct, command or decide.  The Court had no need to decide the question, given the context in which it was acting.
-9-
the former as “the mere organ by whom [the will of the President] is communicated”  – made clear36
that he meant discretion in its largest sense, as those cases in which there is no law to apply and
which “can never be examinable by the courts”; he was not addressing the mixed questions of law
and politics that are the everyday focus of administrative law and of judicial review for “abuse of
discretion” under the APA.  Chief Justice (and former President) Taft, writing for a narrow majority
in Myers v. United States, included this in his lengthy opinion:
The ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute come under the general administrative
control of the President by virtue of the general grant to him of the executive power, and he
may properly supervise and guide their construction of the statutes under which they act in
order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the
Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President
alone.  37
Although this 5-4 decision, written by a former President, is often taken as a particularly strong
evocation of the unitary presidency, note that both the context and this language, as it may properly
be read,  involved an assertion only of supervisory, not decisional, authority.  It addresses the38
President’s right to remove the Postmaster of Portland, Oregon from office, not a claim himself to
take some decision Congress had assigned to that official.  Even as to removal authority the Court
was careful to reserve contexts as to which that degree of political intrusion in law-administration
would be inappropriate.  It would soon enough retreat in confusion from the apparent breadth of that
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  Humphreys’ Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
39
  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
40
  984 F.2d 1534 (1993).
41
  To similar effect, United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).  Where the Attorney
42
General had created a procedure by regulation, he could not dictate a particular decision even to individuals he had
appointed, who served at his will, and whose judgments were subject to his ultimate review.  See Thomas Merrill, The
Accardi Principle, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 569 (2006). 




holding,  and the opinion today is understood to turn on Congress’s effort to reserve participation39
in an act of executive oversight, the removal, rather than on any proposition about the scope of
presidential authority simpliciter.40
The issue was more directly presented to the Ninth Circuit in Portland Audubon Soc. v.
Endangered Species Committee,  in which the court confronted allegations of presidential effort41
covertly to instruct a body consisting of three cabinet secretaries, two administrators of important
federal agencies (one free-standing and one intra-departmental), the Chair of his Council of
Economic Advisors and state representatives he had appointed how they should vote on a desired
exemption from the Endangered Species Act.  Virtually all these officials served him at will – and
hence could have been removed from office at any time, for any reason – but the particular decision
they were taking was one Congress had said should be taken “on the record.”  That was enough in
the court’s view to preclude his ex parte intervention.  It did not matter that he was the chief
executive; nor that the issue was strictly one of policy administration and not in any sense one of
individual right.  The laws he was to execute included the law assigning decision to this (highly
political!) body, following a congressionally specified procedure whose integrity would be destroyed
by his sub rosa intervention.42
The cases most directly casting doubt on presidential direction, like this one, involve
administrative actions Congress has assigned to on-the-record adjudication.  Yet that hardly seems
limiting, since (as in Portland Audubon) the cases do not require that those complaining of
presidential intervention have personal claims of entitlement to on-the-record procedure, as they
might if issues of due process were involved.  The important propositions are that Congress [validly]
assigned decision here and specified that decision should be taken by this official following these
procedures, within these legal constraints.  It is this committee Congress has authorized to act, not
the Department of Agriculture that otherwise controls national forests (or the President) and it has
authorized the committee to act only upon making specified findings following an on-the-record
proceeding.  The adequacy of these limiting instructions, enforced by judicial review of the resulting
decision and its stated rationale for legality, is the coin by which such delegations are sustained.43
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Why aren’t these placements, procedures, and substantive standards for decision always  part of the
laws the President is charged to see will “be faithfully executed”?  Since in these cases there is law
to apply, and the courts do regard these decisions as “examinable by the courts,” on what basis is one
to conclude that the agency actors are the “mere organ by whom [the will of the President] is
communicated”?
That politics alone does not suffice to support decisions subject to judicial review is the lesson
of cases involving documented congressional, rather than presidential, interference in agency
decisionmaking.  Thus, in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA,  the EPA had explained a44
rulemaking choice, that was concededly within EPA’s authority to have chosen, as the choice that
“best responds” to congressional comments it had received.  This explanation, said the court,
is inadequate.  It should go without saying that members of Congress have no power, once
a statute has been passed, to alter its interpretations by post-hoc ‘explanations’ ... . ... An
agency has an obligation to consider the comments of legislators, of course, but on the same
footing as those of other commenters; such comments may have, as Justice [Jackson] said
in a different context, ‘power to persuade if lacking power to control.’  Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).45
Judge Silberman, concurring, characterized the agency’s simple acquiescence to the approach desired
by “formidable political forces,” without offering “its own ... statutory/policy rationale,” as “behavior
[that] is intolerable as a matter of administrative law.”   Strikingly, the cases he cited in support of46
this forceful criticism, premised on the proposition that the duty of decision lies with the agency,
included the most prominent DC Circuit discussion of presidential “prodding.”47
To raise this question is to doubt neither that procedural requirements will sometimes permit
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private presidential consultations (as they don’t in on-the-record proceedings), nor that in such cases
“undisclosed presidential prodding may direct an outcome that is factually based on the record, but
different from the outcome that would have obtained in the absence of presidential involvement.”48
Rather, the question is where legal responsibility for decision lies – in what frame of mind is this
presidential prodding received?  Does the recipient of such communications receive them as political
wishes expressed by the leadership of her administration respecting how she will exercise a
responsibility that by law is hers –  “In this particular case, congress confers a discretionary power,
and requires reasons if I exercise it.  Surely this contemplates responsibility on my part”?   Or does49
she take it as a command that she has a legal as well as a political obligation to honor, and for whose
justifications she thus has no particular responsibility?  
This is precisely the difference between the oversight and the decisional presidency, and in the
difference one may find an ineffable but central question about the psychology of office.
Administrative law straddles the difficult, indistinct, inevitable line between politics and law.  Save
in some inconceivable cyber-age, we could never have a government purely of laws, and we surely
do not wish a government just of men.   At issue is finding the constraint of law operating on50
politics; and in the argument for a decisional presidency one finds a strong move in the “political”
direction.  The congressionally appointed decision-maker, where she is not the President, operates
at the head of a professionally staffed agency, charged with decision (and explanation of decision)
in accordance with stated and generally transparent procedures and a particular statutory framework.
But the President to whom decisional presidency theorists accord a right of decision acts outside
these procedures and laws, without their transparency, and subject only to limited political check.
Scholars and courts writing about the exercise of executive authority often seem careless about
the relationship between political and legal authority,  but one can see that its dimensions are hardly51
trivial.  As Corwin remarked, finding legal authority in the Presidential apparatus, free of the APA’s
constraints of transparency, reasonableness, participation, and limited bases for judgment
would make all questions of law enforcement questions of discretion, the discretion
moreover of an independent and legally uncontrollable branch of the government.  By the
same token, it would render it impossible for Congress, notwithstanding its broad powers
under the "necessary and proper" clause, to leave anything to the specially trained judgment
of a subordinate executive official with any assurance that his discretion would not be
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perverted to political ends for the advantage of the administration in power.52
Professor Todd Rakoff reinforces these doubts by connecting them to the residual force of the
delegation doctrine.  He reminds us of  the important political differences between delegations to an
agency in oversight relationships with President and Congress and courts, and delegations to the
President himself.  Although generally authorized to act in a variety of modes (quasi-legislative,
quasi-executive, quasi-judicial), the agency is competent to act only on a defined subject; if
omnipowered, it is only unicompetent, and its outcomes must be explained in the terms suggested
by its competency.  The President, by contrast, is omnicompetent; it is too hazardous to render him
also omni-powered.  “If the maxim that the only safe power is divided power is indeed a cultural
norm, what would be taboo would be the creation of an organ of government at once omnipowered
and omnicompetent.”  53
Distinguishing the legal from the political not only reinforces the psychology of office for the
administrator, with its arguable contributions to the reasoned decisionmaking and application of
expert judgment that remain major rationales of the administrative state.  For presidential
administration, it also arms the checks and balances instinct in the necessities of publicly firing a
recalcitrant officer, enduring the resulting political reaction, and persuading the Senate to confirm
her more compliant replacement.  So dramatic a step is not likely to follow from a single
disagreement between President and administrator (or, the much likelier situation, presidential staff
and agency administration); ordinarily, that will require repeated mismanagement or departures form
policies of central importance.  These checks are missing  if both sides of the conversation inside the
executive branch understand and accept that, by law, the President is “the decider” of particular
matters. 
In the real world, one might argue, this is a rather fragile distinction – imperiled by the tendencies
both of some leaders to appoint “Yes”-men, and of other appointees, those not meeting this
description, to feel the impulses of political loyalty to a respected superior and of a wish for job
continuity.  An administrator may imagine that the President might not be willing to pay the political
cost of her dismissal, and still have no certainty about it.  People will differ in their estimation what
bluffs are worthy of being called – with an error in that estimation producing a sudden loss of
position and income.  And yet Secretary Duane’s case was hardly the last to be noted in the
literature;  and knowledge of the relative position and stakes – as compared to believing that one54
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has an obligation of obedience, that it is the President’s right to command – opens these political
possibilities.  Moreover, as Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh make clear in their remarkable
study,  the guidance that comes from White House offices – as many as nineteen of them – is often55
conflicting, not unidirectional, cacophonous rather than a single “voice of authority.”  Knowing who
is actually speaking “for the President,” if indeed anyone is, can be challenging indeed.
I.  What is not at issue here – President as Overseer
It may be appropriate to begin with a brief review of presidential authority that is not at issue
here, that readily fits the “oversight” mold and/or that may have been explicitly conferred by
Congress.  Extended discussion’s can be found elsewhere in the literature, as in Bruff’s fine recent
book.56
Appointments: Save as Congress has explicitly provided otherwise for appointment by the courts
or the Heads of Departments,  any officer of the United States must be appointed by the President,57
acting either alone or with senatorial confirmation.
Removals: In the absence of statutory provision limiting removals, such as the civil service laws,
officers of the executive branch serve at will, and may be removed from office by their superiors,
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including the President, for any reason.  Congress cannot reserve its own participation in this
process.  It can restrict, and has restricted, removal in a wide range of circumstances, and an officer’s
role as adjudicator in on-the-record decisionmaking has been taken to imply restrictions on removal;
all these restrictions reserve the possibility of removal if specific “cause” exists, and (as in the case
of the civil service) Congress may also be able to specify the procedures to be followed for “for
cause” removals.  If the commissioners of independent regulatory commissions are “Heads of
Departments,”  one cannot say that Congress is unable to limit the removal of Heads of Departments58
to “cause,”  but Congress perhaps fortunately has not tested the limits of this authority in respect59
of cabinet officials like the Secretary of State, who frequently must serve as the “mere organ” by
which presidential will is expressed, outside the dimensions of the administrative state.   Its closest60
approach came in the setting of the Independent Counsel,  where a decent historical case could be61
made for the legitimacy of vesting appointment authority and disciplinary controls in the courts  and62
prior precedent reached a similar result respecting a Department of Justice regulation.   If the63
President or a cabinet official can create law constraining the executive branch at its highest levels
while it remains effective, it is hard to imagine why the body that constitutionally must delegate such
authority to the executive branch cannot.  What might constitute “cause” remains unsettled, perhaps
fortunately so,  but is clearly linked to the constitutional necessity of effective presidential64
oversight.65
Coordination: The Constitution in terms recognizes the President’s right to consult with those
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who exercise the legal authority Congress delegates in establishing government agencies, although
its terms (he may “require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive
departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices” ) do not state a right66
to command them.  Sensibly for a government as large and diffuse as ours, Congress has provided
for coordination by the President or agencies reporting directly to him across a wide range of
governmental activities: budget proposals, property and acquisitions management, paperwork
requirements, analyses of the environmental and economic impacts of government actions, litigation,
etc.  And it has regularly appropriated significant sums for White House offices as well as the
government agencies directly responsible for actions affecting the public.
The President, additionally, has by executive order or directives issued through his Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) – the principal though hardly the only instrument of his
coordinating activities  – created supplementary coordinating regimes of a generally uncontroversial67
character.  Conflicts between executive agencies about their delegated authority are resolved in
processes involving OMB or the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel.  OMB oversees
coordination of legislative testimony, legislative proposals, agency regulatory agendas, and a variety
of analytic regimes having some, but incomplete support in legislative requirements.  The President
and the White House apparatus directly responsible to him regularly constitute working groups to
develop government-wide initiatives ranging from electronic government to energy policy.
Political synergy: Wholly apart from questions of legal responsibility, the President’s place as
leader of his party and patron of appointees assures strong incentives to follow his wishes.  Ordinary
instincts of political loyalty will subordinate questions of legal authority in many contexts.  One who
values her job and understands that the President can send her home at any time, for any reason,  or
that the success of her operations depend on the support of the White House at budget time, may also
feel strong reasons beyond a sense of legal duty to follow his lead.  
Here, of course, there may be countervailing considerations.  Realists understand that much
presented to them as the President’s wishes may in fact be only the imaginings of a White House
functionary pursuing her own agenda.  Presidential discipline is not costless to the President; and one
charged with leadership of a specialized agency must deal as well with the morale of her own
organization.  The political indiscipline of members of Congress, and their availability to counter
White House pressures, in itself creates space for agency heads to pursue their own responsibilities.
For those who appointments are confirmed by the Senate – those most responsible for an agency’s
conduct of business – political obligations to the Senate, even promises made, may in themselves
create back-currents that can stiffen resolve against presidential prodding.  When does the appointee
have a legal obligation to follow the wishes of her President, and when, rather, is that a matter of
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politics?  When is the President entitled to decide?  What is he entitled not merely to supervise and
seek to reason about, but to control?
II. Staking out the President’s Position – Signing Statements and Other Presidential Initiatives
Presidential assertions of controlling authority come in a variety of forms – Executive Orders
such as established the Federal Legal Council  or the obligation of economic impact analysis under68
OIRA supervision,  OMB circulars requiring pre-clearance of legislative testimony and69
recommendations, generalized directives concerning regulatory business (such as moratoria and
requirements to reexamine existing regulations imposed by the Presidents Bush), and President
Clinton’s agency-and-subject-specific directives revealed and celebrated by Harvard’s Dean Elena
Kagan.   The increasing reach of all these assertions marks the trend underlying the present paper.70
At the present moment, the most hotly disputed forum for such claims are the signing statements
Presidents may issue on approving legislation that, despite their formal approval of the bill (making
it law), express judgments that some elements are unconstitutional and hence not “law,” or that the
law should be interpreted in a manner its enactors would probably find surprising.
Professors Curtis Bradley and Eric Posner [will] have published a careful empirical study of
these signing statements in the Winter issue of Constitutional Commentary,  that makes clear both71
that they have been with us for a long time, and that President Bush’s use of them is distinguished
principally by the number of statutory provisions he has attached them to  and by the strength of his72
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claims about the breadth of executive authority under the Constitution (“the unitary presidency”).
The principal argument of their analysis, hard to disagree with in general, is that in and of themselves
signing statements are unexceptionable.  The statements offer political and even legal advantages
in making known presidential views that he could readily express by other, perhaps less transparent
means.  The legitimate questions about them largely concern not their existence, but their legal force,
if any, and the validity of any legal views they express.  Professors Bradley and Posner are at pains
to demonstrate that the views of the President’s authority underlying President Bush’s signing
statements are little different from those invoked with some frequency by President Clinton.  This
proposition is not so surprising, given the breadth of presidential view exposed to us by Dean Elena
Kagan’s influential account of presidential directives during the Clinton presidency.  73
Professors Bradley and Posner do not explore the merits of the signing statements’ claims to
executive authority.  Brief exposure of them and their breadth may be worthwhile.  That exposure
may help to suggest, if not a radical departure from prior understandings, at least “the generative
force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion
of authority.”74
Appointments and removals As remarked above, the President’s dominant constitutional role in
selecting and disciplining the officers of the United States who work in the executive branch is
uncontroversial.  Yet, other than the President and Vice-President, no executive branch office exists
without legislation; the Philadelphia convention replaced an initial effort to define government
departments in the constitutional text itself with congressional responsibility to define them under
the broad language of the Necessary and Proper Clause:75
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution  in the government of the76
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United States, or in any department or officer thereof.  77
It is on this basis that Congress creates the detailed structures of government.  To what extent can
this legislation constitutionally control qualifications for and tenure in appointments to executive
office?  As others have richly shown,  Congress’s practice from the outset has been highly varied78
– sometimes referring to presidential control of decision and more often not, sometimes imposing
qualifications on officers (“learned in the law”) and more often not, sometimes creating fixed terms
of office for officers and more often not, sometimes giving them reporting relations to Congress and
more often not.  May it fix qualifications for appointment and/or safeguard officers against removal
at will? 
Article II, Sec. 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution provides that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such
inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the
heads of departments. 
Armed in part with the Incompatibility Clause’s clear instruction that Members of Congress may
have no part in law-execution,  the Supreme Court has firmly rejected on constitutional grounds79
congressional efforts to participate in the nomination of persons holding executive office – whether
directly  or by statutory designation that sharply constrains the President’s choices to those whom80
members might influence.   They have rejected congressional participation in removals.   They81 82
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have worried about constraints on the President’s seeking advice about appointments,  and83
suggested – in language that imperils appointment authority granted the heads of the CIA, the EPA
and the independent regulatory commissions – that the last five words, “in the heads of
departments,” can only mean cabinet departments.   What the Court has not suggested is that a84
statutory limitation of appointment to widely held qualities readily understood as qualifications for
office – that the Surgeon General must be a licensed physician, the Solicitor General a person
“learned in the law,” members of independent regulatory commissions balanced in their political
party affiliations – could not be as much an element of Congress’s “necessary and proper” authority
in relationship to those “officers ... which shall be established by law,” as its placement of the
National Park Service and Bureau of Land Management in the Department of the Interior but the
Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture.85
Professors Bradley and Posner rightly point out that President Clinton as well as President Bush
objected on constitutional grounds to limitations on the President’s appointment authority.  They cite
as examples a Clinton signing statement objecting to a requirement that four of the five members the
Secretary of Transportation was to appoint to a committee with responsibilities for historic federally
owned lighthouses in Maine must be persons recommended or designated by certain Maine officials
or organizations,  and another  protesting a restriction on appointments as U.S. Trade86 87
Representative to persons who had never “directly represented, aided, or advised a foreign entity (as
defined by section 207(f)(3) of Title 18) in any trade negotiation, or trade dispute, with the United
States”  – “a broad group of the most knowledgeable and experienced practitioners in the field of88
international trade,” as a subsequent OLC memo characterized the matter.   With these objections,89
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compare President Bush’s objection to a statutory provision, enacted in the wake of the Hurricane
Katrina scandals, limiting appointments to the head of the Federal Emergency Management
Administration to persons “who have—
(A) a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and homeland
security; and 
(B) not less than 5 years of executive leadership and management experience in the public
or private sector.”   90
as unconstitutionally “rul[ing] out a large portion of those persons best qualified by experience and
knowledge to fill the office.”   Perhaps, as they speculate, this is merely a symptom of an inclination91
in the present Justice Department to thoughtless bureaucratic routine, but it suggests a view of the
President’s illimitable authority that has currency in scholarly circles today.92
Recommending legislation and providing Congress with requested information 
In addressing the President’s relationship with Congress, Article II frames one far less intimate
than the Prime Minister of any parliamentary democracy would enjoy:
He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and
recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient;
he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in case of
disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them
to such time as he shall think proper;93
This language obliges the President to keep Congress informed of the state of the union – to provide
it “from time to time” with information – and to recommend to it what he imagines will be useful
legislation.  But beyond the threat of a possible veto, the strings of party loyalty, and the possible
implications of his limited capacity to keep Congress in session or send it home, he has no power
over legislative business – his proposals have no greater standing as a legal matter than
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recommendations that might be made by the National Association of Manufacturers or the Sierra
Club.  None becomes legislative business without a congressional sponsor, and that sponsor is free
to alter the terms of a proposal as she will, before submitting it to the clerk.
Can one find in this language of weak and remote relationship (or in the grant to the President
of executive power generally) a constitutional prohibition against statutes that ask government
agencies to make legislative proposals, to adopt within a stated time frame regulations on stated
subjects, or to provide Congress with studies or information on defined subjects?  Must any such
communication be routed through the White House, and submitted only if it wins presidential
approval?  Recall that on appropriations, which the Constitution makes clear must be annual
legislative business, it was not until 1921 – with its creation of a Bureau of Budget as a White House
office, balanced by the simultaneous creation of Congress’s General Accounting Office (GAO)  –94
that appropriations became a subject of coordinated presidential recommendation;  previously, all
those communications occurred between Congress and relevant departments.  Recall too that since
that time, as part of this general arrangement, GAO (i.e., at least arguably  congressional)95
bureaucrats have continuously resided in government agencies, soliciting as well as investigating
information from them.
Presidents have long used the Bureau of the Budget and its modern successor, the Office of
Management and Budget, as coordinating bodies for all legislative proposals, not merely budgetary
ones, and Congress has generally cooperated – providing only occasionally, as for independent
regulatory commissions, that budgetary proposals are to be submitted directly to it.  OMB circulars
require pre-clearance of testimony at congressional hearings and submissions in response to requests
for information as well as legislative matters.  The politics here are easy to understand – the politics
of agency compliance as well as those of presidential command – but are the obligations legal ones,
and obligations so firmly grounded in the Constitution that Congress could not alter them?  
As a matter of logic, the President’s right to submit to Congress such proposals and information
as he wishes does not entail a legal right to resist statutory provisions seeking proposals and/or
information he might not independently wish to generate – much less, the legal power to forbid other
officers of the government to respond to statutes requiring them to submit proposals, information or
advice.  What the Constitution says on that subject is that the President may “require the opinion,
in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating
to the duties of their respective offices,”  not that he may keep those officers from performing any96
such duty as the Congress may statutorily have assigned to them (and not to him).   Of course the
President could not be constrained from giving Congress his own views of the state of the nation,
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or telling Congress whether he thought an agency head’s invited legislative recommendations
“necessary and expedient.”  Nor can one deny the practical utility (as well as the constitutional right)
of the President informing himself what his departments are telling or recommending to the
Congress, and presenting on his own behalf a coordinated view.  But the assertion that the
Constitution requires that he have exclusive authority – that only presidentially approved statements
or recommendations may be made, in the face of statutes providing otherwise – is rather hard to find
in the modest descriptions of presidential role to be found in Article II. 
Note the limited nature of the argument.  It  assumes a statute calling upon an agency to submit
information or proposals, as in the Homeland Security Act Appropriations legislation discussed in
the following paragraphs.   In the budget context, the Budget and Accounting Act  gives the97
President a general claim to be the exclusive spokesperson to Congress (subject to the exceptions
Congress occasionally makes for independent regulatory commissions; and even here the President
is clearly entitled to be informed in advance of the agency’s submission, U.S. Const. Art. II Sec. 2,
cl. 1).  Absent congressional instruction, where the issue may be resolving policy questions of broad
scope, the President’s claim to control as well as consultation is considerably stronger; one is no
longer talking about “the Duties of their respective offices.”   But where Congress has enacted (and98
the President has assented to or been overriden in his objections) a statute placing responsibility in
a specific agency’s hands?
Professors Bradley and Posner demonstrate that Presidents have long been claiming an inherent
right of control, as objections to statutory directions.  Still it may be useful to observe their spreading
reach.  In 1988, President Reagan wrote that “[T]he President enjoys plenary and exclusive authority
to determine whether and when he should propose legislation to the Congress.”   Three years later99
the first President Bush made a stronger and broader claim: “Article II, section 3 of the Constitution
vests the President with exclusive authority to decide whether and when the executive branch should
propose legislation.”   Next, consider the example Profs. Bradley and Posner use from President100
Clinton’s signing statements:
Section 4422 of the bill purports to require the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to
develop a legislative proposal for establishing a case-mix adjusted prospective payment
system for payment of long-term care hospitals under the Medicare program.  I will construe
this provision in light of my constitutional duty and authority to recommend to the Congress
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such legislative measures as I judge necessary and expedient, and to supervise and guide my
subordinates, including the review of their proposed communications to the Congress.101
Note that this statement does not explicitly assert the authority to obstruct the requested proposal;
supervision, guidance and review need not imply a claim of right to prevent communication; one
supposes, too, that the President need not himself submit a proposal, and could readily cause the
Secretary to attach to his submission a note indicating that the President did not regard the proposal
as “necessary and expedient.”   Finally, compare with this a characteristic recent such statement102
from President Bush:
Section 503(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by section 611 of the Act,
provides for the appointment and certain duties of the Administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. ... [S]ection 503(c)(4) purports to regulate the provision
of advice within the executive branch and to limit supervision of an executive branch official
in the provision of advice to the Congress. The executive branch shall construe section
503(c)(4) in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to require
the opinions of heads of departments and to supervise the unitary executive branch.
Accordingly, the affected department and agency shall ensure that any reports or
recommendations submitted to the Congress are subjected to appropriate executive branch
review and approval before submission.103
Now a claim of right of approval is explicitly made, and a “unitary executive branch” explicitly
referred to.  As Professors Bradley and Posner remark, quoting leading exponents, “[t]he central
tenets of the unitary executive theory are ‘the president’s power to remove subordinate policy-
making officials at will, the president’s power to direct the manner in which subordinate officials
exercise discretionary executive power, and the president’s power to veto or nullify such official’s
exercises of discretionary power.’”   104
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Directing outcomes, not merely effort
The italicized language makes clear the breadth of the current claims to presidential authority.
In directing officials what he wished them to do, even with the specificity Professor Kagan’s
account  revealed, President Clinton seems to have been careful not to assert that he had the105
authority himself directly to act, rather than to discipline an official who failed to do what he
properly requested.  Professors Bradley and Posner hypothesize that because so strong a unitary
executive “theory itself is quite controversial in academia, ... it is probably no coincidence that
Clinton did not use the term itself.”   In her analysis, Dean Kagan grounds President Clinton’s106
practice and understanding in policy considerations that Congress could alter if it chose, while
arguing that Congress should be understood presumptively to have accepted presidential
command.  Consider, for example, two passages from his statement on signing H.R. 4635, the107
Fiscal Year 2001 Appropriations Legislation.   The first passage of note expresses regret that108
Congress had used the appropriations process – that device by which it so frequently handcuffs the
presidential veto – to restrict certain environmental projects:
I am disappointed ... that the final bill includes anti-environmental riders that my
Administration opposed. I continue to oppose the use of the budget process to adopt these
kinds of proposals without the benefit of full and open public debate through the regular
legislative process. I urge Congress to refrain from sending me any additional
anti-environmental riders on remaining bills. Although I am signing this legislation into law
with these riders attached, I am directing the agencies to consider ways to implement them
that will have the least harmful effect on the environment.  109
The presidential direction neither denies the law Congress has enacted, nor tells responsible officials
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President.
... [T]here are undoubtedly executive functions that, regardless of the enactments of Congress, must be
performed by officers subject to removal at will by the President.
  See n. 30 above.
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precisely what they are to do; it gives them an impulse to administer within the possibilities that the
enacted text permits, and accepts that these specific judgments are theirs.  
The second passage addresses an element of the same complex appropriations bill limiting the
term of an Under-Secretary of Energy, and further providing that this official could be removed from
office only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.  Given “the Under Secretary's
significant executive authority and responsibility in nuclear security,” the President wrote, “I
understand the phrase ‘neglect of duty’ to include, among other things, a failure to comply with the
lawful directives or policies of the President.”   While this may seem a strong assertion of110
presidential prerogative, note how central to issues of national security (not just administration) the
official’s responsibilities were  and, even in this freighted context, the concessions inherent both111
in the use of the word “lawful” and in the President’s choice of remedy – substitution of a new actor,
and not substitution of the desired decision.  This position is fundamentally the same as was reflected
in President Jackson’s and Secretary Duane’s understanding respecting who had authority to transfer
government deposits in the U.S. Bank: “In this particular case, congress confers a discretionary
power, and requires reasons if I exercise it.  Surely this contemplates responsibility on my part.”112
Where President Jackson ultimately accepted Secretary Duane’s observation, President Bush
claims the right not merely to know, but formally to approve the FEMA Administrator’s performance
of his statutory obligation.  In effect he asserts that, however Congress may choose to create
executive duties, the responsibility and right of fulfilling them is his.  The line between overseer and
decider seems now definitively to have been crossed.
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III.  Unitary Control of Statutory Interpretation?
A. The Authority of the Justice Department
Perhaps one place one could look for unitary controls over legal issues is in the offices
responsible for the government’s legal opinions, in the Department of Justice.  What impact outside
the Department do its opinions have?  Here one instinct might be to try to distinguish between the
authority to give opinions that are mandatory within the executive branch – that bind executive
actors, but not the courts; and opinions that reach the outside world, that even courts would be
obliged to respect.  Yet the reader familiar with administrative law will quickly see the Supreme
Court’s iconic opinion in Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., looming on the
horizon: if the President or his lawyer is able to state a legal view that an agency must accept, then
perhaps that view (if a reasonable interpretation of a relevantly indeterminate statute) will also be
one a court is obliged to accept.  If, for example, an interpretation offered by the President in a
signing statement is more than a recommendation to the responsible agency, but rather a directive
it is obliged to accept, we will have found an important way in which the President is “the decider,”
that perhaps amplifies the concerns many have expressed about the Chevron limitation on judicial
role – or perhaps it rationalizes that limitation in important political terms.
Professor Cornelia Pillard has extensively and persuasively treated the practices and authority
of the two departmental offices chiefly responsible for developing departmental positions, the
Solicitor General’s office (litigation) and the Office of Legal Counsel (advice) in a recent article,113
that there is little reason to repeat here.  As she amply demonstrates, strikingly limited statutory or
even executive authority supports the proposition that the Attorney General’s opinions on legal
matters are entitled to controlling status.   Early Attorneys General disagreed as to whether their114
opinions were legally binding in any way on executive agencies.  Many simply stated without much
elaboration that an Attorney General’s opinion either may be disregarded by executive agencies115
or, conversely, must be accepted by them.   The contrasting views of Attorneys General Wirt and116
Cushing, frequently the pair isolated in the literature, have already been referred to.   Consider as117
well the views of Attorneys General Black: 
The duty of the Attorney General is to advise, not to decide.  A thing is not to be considered
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done as done by the head of a department merely because the Attorney General has advised
him to do it.  You may disregard his opinion if you are sure it is wrong.  He aids you in
forming a judgment on questions of law; but still the judgment is yours, not his.  You are not
bound to see with his eyes, but only to use the light which he furnishes, in order to see the
better with your own.
But though the opinions from this office have technically no binding effect, it is generally
safer and better to adopt them.  Uniformity of decision in the different departments, on
similar subjects, is necessary, and cannot be secured otherwise.118
and Brewster:
[W]hile it is the duty of the Attorney-General to give his opinion upon questions of law
arising in the administration of any Executive Department at the request of the head thereof,
such duty ends with the rendition of the opinion, which is advisory only.  The Attorney
General has no control over the action of the Head of Department to whom the opinion is
addressed, nor could he with propriety express any judgment concerning the disposition of
the matter to which the opinion relates, that being something wholly within the
administrative sphere and discretion of such Head of Department.119
Even Attorney General Cushing, while asserting that opinions of the Attorney General were “quasi-
judicial” in character, and “have come to constitute a body of legal precedents and exposition, having
authority the same in kind, if not the same in degree, with decisions of the courts of justice,”120
acknowledged that they were advisory only.   While governmental actors had almost uniformly121
followed Attorney General opinions, and had done so to promote uniformity of rules across multiple
departments (and to avoid being branded as evading their legal obligations), the Judiciary Act of
1789 did not provide that Attorney General opinions would be binding on other agencies.   122
Congress might establish this effect by statute, as it has empowered the Attorney General (largely
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acting through the Solicitor General) to control government appellate litigation.  The provision
respecting the Solicitor General’s authority is rather straightforward – the only controversy  being
whether statutes creating independent litigating authority for agencies, as for the typical independent
regulatory commission, operate as an exception:
28 U.S.C. § 518. Conduct and argument of cases
(a) Except when the Attorney General in a particular case directs otherwise, the Attorney
General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme
Court and suits in the United States Court of Federal Claims or in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and in the Court of International Trade in which the United
States is interested. ...
§ 519. Supervision of litigation
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all litigation to
which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all United
States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and special attorneys appointed under
section 543 of this title in the discharge of their respective duties.123
Of course, the Solicitor General is an advocate; in the cases where he wields his authority, the actual
decisions on points of law will be a court’s.  This is so even where what he has done is to deny an
agency’s request to petition for a writ of certiorari, or take an appeal, because in his judgment the
court below reached the right result (or, less conclusively, that the taking of an appeal on these facts
to this court represents to great a litigating risk for a government with a lot at stake in its courts,
every day).  The only authority that endures, that will be cited inside of government as well as out,
is that of the court; there is no formal obstacle to seeking to have the same question reviewed on
some future occasion when it arises again in a fresh case.  That the SG has declined to authorize an
appeal, even if known, could no more be cited for future authority than that the Supreme Court had
denied certiorari. 
Compare with this direct language that of the act that created the Department of Justice in 1870,
which stated that an Attorney General could delegate his opinion writing authority to a subordinate
and that, if the AG approved the opinion, “such approval . . . shall give the opinion the same force
and effect as belong to the opinions of the Attorney General.”   In 1893, noting this language,124
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Attorney General Olney expressed the view that
Evidently ... Congress contemplates that the official opinions signed or indorsed in writing
by the Attorney General shall have some actual and practical force.  Congress’s intention
cannot be doubted that the administrative officers should regard them as law until withdrawn
by the Attorney General or overruled by the courts ...  125
Yet this statutory language is considerably less direct, in dealing with the government’s solicitor,
than one finds in respect of its barrister.  And even this language has now disappeared.  The modern
successor to the 1870 Act does not contain the “same force and effect” language and (except for
opinions rendered to the Department of Defense) characterizes the Attorney General’s views,
whether transmitted to the President or to a cabinet secretary, only as “advice” or “opinion.”   And126
the Office of Legal Counsel obscures the issue by insisting up front that agencies they advise agree
to accept their advice; otherwise they must act without it.  In 200 years, Professor Pillard observes,
the issue had not had to be resolved.127
Perhaps the President could command agencies to accept OLC opinions by Executive Order.  The
likely candidate here is Executive Order 12,146,  which provided for the establishment of a sizable,128
collegial Federal Legal Council chaired by the Attorney General to promote “the efficient and
effective management of Federal legal resources that are beyond the capacity or authority of
individual agencies to resolve.”   Two sections are of particular note for their implicit limitation,129
even as a matter of presidential claim:
1-401. Whenever two or more Executive agencies are unable to resolve a legal dispute
between them, including the question of which has jurisdiction to administer a particular
program or to regulate a particular activity, each agency is encouraged to submit the
dispute to the Attorney General.
1-402. Whenever two or more Executive agencies whose heads serve at the pleasure of the
President are unable to resolve such a legal dispute, the agencies shall submit the dispute
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to the Attorney General prior to proceeding in any court, except where there is specific
statutory vesting of responsibility for a resolution elsewhere.
No corresponding provisions address matters that are not in dispute between competing agencies.
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Attorney General Barr found certainty in these provisions only that 
. . .  [T]he Attorney General’s opinions do bind the executive branch ...with respect to
interagency disputes.  This highlights another change from the early days of the Attorney
General . . . many of the early Attorneys General [did not think their advice was binding].130
It should be evident how important would be some mechanism for resolving interagency disputes
within the executive branch, short of litigation.  The existence of such a dispute is, in itself, some
evidence that Congress failed clearly to assign the task to a particular agency.  For disputes between
agencies “whose heads serve at the pleasure of the President,” the questions that might be raised
about the justiciability of the dispute if aired as between them add significant force to the Executive
Order’s requirement and rationale.
Indeed, one can find at least inferential Supreme Court recognition of the role that presidential
oversight of accommodations can play in such circumstances.   Take, for example, its resolution131
of a dispute involving arguably conflicting EPA and NRC authority over radioactive pollution
emanating from NRC-licensed facilities.   While principally resolving the issue as a matter of132
statutory interpretation – unanimously insisting in doing so on the necessity of consulting legislative
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history,  an approach that could hardly be imagined today – the Court carefully noted the133
President’s characterization of the Reorganization Plan by which the EPA had acquired authority,
and an AEC -EPA memorandum of understanding subsequently published in the Federal Register,134
both strongly supporting its outcome.   The President as “the Decider” – or at least as the135
preliminary and often enough in practice the final decider – seems an inevitable outcome.136
Congress will not clearly have established where authority lies; here one may recall the first two
elements of Justice Robert Jackson’s justly admired tri-partite analysis of the relationship between
presidential authority and congressional command in Youngstown Sheet & Tube:137
Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress. ...
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate.  In these circumstances, and in these
only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty.
If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the
Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power.  A seizure executed by the
President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of
presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden  of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.     
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain.  Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence
may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility.
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Should the issue ever reach the courts, it would likely be decided – as in the cited case – as a matter
of statutory interpretation, in which the presidential view would be taken as indicative but not
authoritative.  Under the Constitution, it is Congress that constructs and instructs the agencies of
government under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
One might pause to note that, at least as it is currently articulated and in the absence of direct
congressional authorization, the Chevron doctrine would have no application to such a presidential
judgment.  Where “no single agency with enforcement power has been charged with administration
of [a statute, it is universally agreed] that Chevron does not apply."   The central premise of138
Chevron is that deference is warranted precisely because a statute has explicitly or implicitly
delegated to an agency a unique and specialized authority to render interpretations with force and
effect of law.   It was the EPA that unambiguously held the authority to use (or not) the “bubble”139
concept in administering the Clean Air Act, an authority that – at least in terms of statutory language
– it shared with no other agency.  When the President is allocating responsibilities as between the
EPA and the AEC, in the face of statutes unclear as to their precise reach, he is acting outside this
defined realm.  As has in fact been their practice,  we anticipate that the courts will resolve such140
allocational issues for themselves when they are presented to them – perhaps according some
deference to an accommodation reached by actors better able to understand the full range of
considerations entailed, but not imagining this as a matter entrusted to those actors’ judgment. 
Consistent congressional practice in relation to executive branch reorganization strengthens this
sense.  When Congress conferred reorganization authority on the President, as it often did in the
year’s preceding the Supreme Court’s decision in Chadha v. INS,  sweepingly disapproving the141
legislative veto, it was willing to do so only under conditions that assured it veto-proof control over
the President’s exercise of that authority.   Reorganization acts conferring broad power on the142
President to reshape executive government, subject to legislative approval, came to an end with the
Supreme Court’s disapproval of the legislative veto.  Congress promptly created a “fast-track” bill
procedure for two-house approvals of presidential submissions of reorganization proposals, that
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could not otherwise take effect.   This is, in effect, the same regime.143
Professor Pillard, in her extended discussion,  develops at length the arguable differences144
between the roles of advocate (SG) and counsellor (OLC), while observing that politics and law may
be somewhat intermixed for both offices – perhaps more so for OLC – and that such purchase as
either office enjoys inside government as an objective legal analyst is basically dependent on its
analysis of judicial doctrine.   The acceptability of a role for OLC in fixing legal meaning is further145
compromised, she argues, by the often impaired transparency of its judgments  and the absence of146
the kinds of external check supplied, for example, by the SG’s need to maintain a long-term
relationship with the Court before which he so often appears.   And if such disinterested expertise147
as OLC may have within government is fundamentally derivative of judicial doctrine, that gives the
proposition that its judgments might be entitled to special deference by the courts a certain
circularity.  Or, one might say, to the extent courts would conclude interpretive authority had been
placed in executive hands, no reason other than politics to accord it deference.
B. Chevron deference for presidential interpretations?
Now suppose a case raising no question “which [agency] has jurisdiction to administer a
particular program or to regulate a particular activity,” and one in which the statute confers no
participatory right on the President.  (If the statute is one of those in which Congress has provided
for a presidential role – if it has in terms delegated decisional authority to him – the difficulties
discussed here do not arise.)  Then the issue is simply whether as the person vested with “the
executive power,” and responsible to “take care that the laws be faithfully administered,” the
President may displace the designated agency’s judgment with his own.  Of course that designation
is a part of at least the statutory law.  If one takes Congress’s designation of, say, the EPA as its
statutory decision about who should exercise the power it is creating, the third element of Justice
Jackson’s triad now comes into play: 
 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter.  Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.  Presidential claim to a power
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at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Two questions then – first, whether one should nonetheless treat Presidential directorial authority
as compatible with the implied will of Congress; and second, whether even if not, the Constitution
requires the conclusion that he must possess that authority. 
Dean Kagan’s influential analysis, supported by analyses such as Sunstein and Lessig’s,   essays148
an affirmative answer to the first of these questions.  Thus, it works to remove a presidential claim
of decisional authority from Justice Jackson’s third category to his second – or perhaps even first.
Acknowledging the weakness of the proposition that “his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter” in itself make him “the decider,” she urges us to
imply a congressional delegation to him of decision authority from congressional silence, from the
absence of an express provision.  
Professor Kevin Stack, a younger scholar, has published his second analysis of the "statutory
president," largely consistent with the positions taken here.   One striking contribution of this149
contribution to the literature is its careful cataloguing of the numerous occasions on which Congress
has been explicit in making administrative action subject to presidential review or control – drawing
the strong implication that in other cases it would be inappropriate to infer a wish for that outcome
on its part.   This shows a technical difficulty with Dean Kagan’s argument with remarkable
thoroughness: Congress has known how to empower the President as “decider” throughout our
national history – and most clearly so in that period, just after the Constitution’s adoption, when one
can regard the Congress’s work as the influential deposit of “contemporaneous construction ... by
the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work
efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.”   This often-quoted phrase,   was150 151
an early explanation of a reason for judges to assign some weight in the balancing scales (one
meaning of “deference,” if not Chevron’s) to agency interpretations of statutes even though, as the
Court also said in one prominent decision relying on it, “The interpretation of the meaning of
statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is exclusively a judicial function.”   The proposition152
seems hardly less apt for early congressional interpretations of the Constitution, even granted a court
might also affirm that the interpretation of the meaning of the Constitution, as applied to justiciable
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controversies, is exclusively a judicial function.   Congress has made agency decision subject to153
presidential override when it has wished to; and omitted that in other statutes passed in the same
period, and in circumstances in which one can readily infer the basis for differential judgment.  Dean
Kagan’s suggested implication is thus wholly unwarranted as a factual proposition.  
As Professor Stack also shows, the argument for implication of delegation to the President has
normative risks to “the equilibrium established by our constitutional system”  as well.  These are154
given point by the signing statement controversy and last Term’s Supreme Court decisions in
Gonzales  and Hamdan,  that suggest that the present Court is within a vote of recognizing broad155 156
executive authority to create law without even the bother of public processes such as attend APA
adjudication and rulemaking.  If the President is entitled to be “the decider” on matters ostensibly
committed to agency discretion, does that enhance or undercut the Supreme Court’s iconic decision
in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.?  Are views the President may
express about statutory meaning in signing statements “law” for the officers of the executive branch;
and, if so, may they claim Chevron obedience from the courts, the lesser (but arguably significant)
respect suggested by the Court’s subsequent decision, troublesome to some, in United States v. Mead
Corp.; or are they just elements of legislative history as appropriately discarded from consideration
as any other, given current fashions in statutory interpretation?
Scholars arguing for presidential decisional authority as a normally desirable element of the
contemporary administrative state rather than as constitutional command, have asserted that such
authority would give greater legitimacy to the Court’s Chevron analysis by adding the weight of
centralized political judgment to what may be implicit in congressional delegation.  They note the
opinion’s concluding passages indicating a reliance on the President’s political oversight role as one
of the opinion’s rationales.  The central passages of Chevron for these purposes, occurring in the
opinion’s peroration, are the following:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government.  Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on
the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences.  In contrast, an agency to which
Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments.  While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices - resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
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inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.  In such a case, federal
judges - who have no constituency -   have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made
by those who do.  The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones:
"Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."  TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 195 (1978).  157
While, to be sure, these passages celebrate the political controls of the President, note how the
emphasized portions suggest, at the least, that the Court was unaware of the possible implication for
presidential authority now sought to be drawn.  The bolded phrases assume the location of decision
in the agency; the italicized phrase suggests but does not define the nature of presidential
involvement; the underscored phrase comes closest to placing decision with the President, faintly
echoing the emphatic terms of Chief Justice Marshall’s disclaimer in Marbury v. Madison.   But158
the echo is faint.  In the world as imagined by Chief Justice Marshall, an executive officer might be
“the mere organ by whom [the will of the President] is communicated,”  acting under159
circumstances which “can never be examinable by the courts.”  In the ordinary world of
administrative law, courts have extensive review authority over decisions such as the EPA made in
Chevron – review authority extending to their reasonableness in terms of the agency’s mandate.160
To make Chevron turn entirely on presidential politics is to omit consideration of the role of
“reasonableness” in relation to those matters found to fall within the area of discretion constituting
“Step two” of its analysis.  
While Chevron sensibly accepts the President’s political role as mediating the difficulties of
focused bureaucratic expertise, it does not purport to displace reliance on the latter – indeed, the
structure of judicial review of administrative action depends, top to bottom, on the presumption that
the matter being reviewed is in some respects the product of an expert, not merely a political
judgment.  Not a word in Chevron suggests tolerance for the proposition that decision could be made
by anyone but the administrator of the EPA, following the procedures and within the parameters of
consideration set for that official by the Clean Air Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.  Were
it otherwise, it would be hard indeed to understand the Court’s insistence, in the subsequently
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decided Whitman v. American Trucking Assns.,  that she would not be authorized to consider costs,161
as such, in pursuing her mandate, when the President’s own commitment to the centrality of cost
considerations to administrative rulemaking is so clearly established.
It is worth recalling, in this connection, that agencies adopt roughly ten times as many rules each
year as Congress adopts statutes.  The proposition, then, that the President, but not Congress, might
directly control these outcomes would make of congressional delegations an even more remarkable
transfer of authority than is usually addressed.  Indeed, one could find in it the mirror-image of the
concern that underlay the Court’s rejection of the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha.   There, the162
flaw lay in the defeat of presidential controls; here we would discover the defeat of congressional
control.  Should Congress disagree with any rule, it would have to transcend its own veto-gates and
the President’s veto to overcome it.   Imagining the rulemaking agency as merely the “organ by163
whom [the will of the President] is communicated” is a far cry from seeing it embedded in oversight
relations with President and Congress and courts.
We can also have no illusions that the decision will be made by “the” President, that one
individual who has been elected by the public and vested with “the executive power,” rather than a
single appointed official.   It will, rather, be made within an apparatus of a few thousand White164
House employees (working within the properly protected opacity of that institution, out of the reach
of the APA and the Freedom of Information Act  ), in relation to a decision reached with the help165
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of a more extensive and expert staff, operating under those conditions of enhanced transparency and
procedural regularity.  Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh document for us how varied and often
conflicting were the voices the EPA officials they interviewed heard – whether in the first President
Bush’s administration or in President Clinton’s – and how much more impaired was public access
to the circumstances of that advice than agency action.   Given the overwhelming complexity and166
activity level of modern government, White House officials can attend no more than a fraction of
issues having to be decided.  One should doubt rather than presume that in delegating lawmaking
authority that it imagined would be exercised at some remove from raw politics, pursuant to the APA
and subject to FOIA, Congress authorized any such outcome.   In all but the most extraordinary
cases, invocation of “the President’s will” in relation to ordinary administration will be the product
of a politically driven accident making this one issue salient, out of the thousands that remain
unattended – a bolt of lightning hurled by one unelected operative, whose political valience is high,
whose expertise is stretched and staff support limited, and whose exposure to public view and
obligations of procedural regularity are low, against another somewhat more removed from electoral
political concerns, supported by more extensive and expert staff, and operating under conditions of
enhanced transparency and procedural regularity.  
If judgment on the issues left open to Chevron’s second step is the agency’s, it will have been
taken in light of an administrative record and explained in terms of the agency’s own mandate.  That
Chevron deference is owing only to judgments about statutes uniquely committed to the
administration of the agency claiming it, in itself implies an understanding that it will be the agency
itself making this determination, in light of its particular responsibilities and expertise.  If on the
other hand we say this may be decided outside the agency, we have disconnected decision from the
particular limits of that statute, from the uniqueness of its delegation, from the intricate
understanding a given agency may have of the interconnections of its regulatory mission, from the
administrative record – we have made politics not only an element, but the dominating element. 
Recognizing presidential decisional authority, in this perspective, is precisely a conversion of
discretion controlled by law into the DISCRETION! Chief Justice Marshall evoked.
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Even the political argument from the fact of the President’s election is troublesome, to the extent
it could be seen as making a differential case for presidential political control.  It is not easy to
construct a credible political mandate for such authority from the simple fact of the President’s
national election.  A recent article by Prof. Jide Nzelibe rather persuasively challenges the
proposition that the President is a more reliable spokesperson for national politics than the Congress,
taken as a collective; or that agencies responding only to the President would be more reflective of
contemporary political judgment than those subject to the oversight of both political branches.167
Voters cannot credibly be credited with either the information or the will that might vest such
authority in a single official (and his immediate aides).
One might note that the Justices who are most enthusiastic about executive authority, and nearly
prevailed on those questions last Term, are the same ones who insist most strenuously that legislative
history is inappropriate for judges to consider when interpreting statutory text, and who are most
likely to question the line the Court has drawn between formal and informal agency action, between
Chevron and Mead.  Consider what the implications of the dissents in Gonzales and Hamdan might
be for the status of presidential “interpretations” such as appear in signing statements (or OLC
opinions) if they were challenged in court.  If the President is the decider – if he is empowered to
decide matters ostensibly committed to administrative agencies, if his views as theirs are entitled to
Chevron deference and if the dissents of the 2005 Term were to prevail, so that courts would defer
to presidential interpretations even when not the product of any direct congressional empowerment,
what would be the political consequences?  Again, should Congress disagree with those views, it
would have to transcend its own veto-gates and the President’s veto to overcome them.  
And the courts, thanks to Chevron, will regard these views as the President’s business not theirs.
The EPA’s understanding of the APA does not get Chevron deference.  But if the President gets to
decide what the statute means – that is, if the President is entitled to control what the administrator
says the statute means, if that is not an issue committed to the discretion of the administrator,
exercised with reasons – now we have a single, and infinitely political, generalist handcuffing the
courts in their oversight of the administrative state.  When the President announces in a signing
statement how he understands a statute, we can know and accept that this is a political message to
his government what he would prefer.  But can we accept that it creates a legal obligation on them
and then, in effect, on the courts? 
One argument that might be made in support of the strong “unitary executive” proposition  is168
that it constitutes an understandable and ultimately persuasive political response to the situation in
which Ronald Reagan and his Republican successors found themselves in relation to the career civil
service – notoriously Democrat still, even after a quarter century of largely Republican
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presidencies.   Enhancing the claims of the “unitary executive,” enforced by a White House staff169
whose politics it could largely control, was an obvious tactic against these entrenched actors holding
different views.  Memoranda of the time make plain the deliberateness with which a campaign to
enhance the presidency was being undertaken.   The campaign may have had its roots as170
importantly in the wish to repair the institutional damage done to the presidency by Watergate and
VietNam, and arguably weak presidencies following, as in this pointed political agenda.  And a
number of elements of change that can be identified to the period – the creation of a Senior Civil
Service more amenable to incentive and political control; the institution of regulatory review for
economic and other impacts  – offer enhanced coordination and influence without necessarily171
entailing substituted judgment.
The other side of this argument, again suggesting the place of knowledge and expertise as well
as politics in ordinary administration, is that the professional civil service within any particular
agency serves as an anchor against the influence of raw politics in the exercise of delegated
responsibilities.  This potential as a further check on the executive has been persuasively imagined
by Professor Neal Kumar Katyal.   And the civil service would lie defenseless before an agency172
head’s understanding that she was obliged to accept a President’s interpretation, and that it could be
expected to prevail before the courts.  Where would their advice have purchase? Central direction
expending to the commanding of decisions congressionally placed within an agency and reflecting
its unique responsibilities and expertise seems more than the simple rebalancing of an equation that
had been permitted to decay into an inappropriately weak chief executive.   Given the extent to173
which the authority to create law has in fact been placed in executive agency hands, it appears rather
as a threat to the engine of practical checks and balances that, for more than two centuries, has
helped keep American government on a democratic track.
C.  The President as Decider on Issiues of Priority
Perhaps a stronger case for the President as “the Decider” in ordinary administration arises in
contexts where we do not expect judicial review, a developed record for administrative action,
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relatively formal administrative process, or FOIA transparency.  Developing the agenda for
regulation – deciding what rulemakings will be given effort during the coming year – is readily
associated with programmatic considerations that do seem closely linked to a President’s election;
and here one may note that the last two Presidents have been more emphatic about their authority,
requiring the independent regulatory commissions to participate in the processes of Executive Order
12,866 for coordinating regulatory agendas  although not requiring their participation in later stages174
of the economic impact analysis process.  The presumptive ordinary unreviewability of agency
decisions whether or not to act, on analogy to prosecutorial functions that are explicitly characterized
as executive matters,  similarly suggests presidential control.  Full analysis of these issues would175
require many pages, and one can imagine one’s reader’s patience already taxed.  But it seems
possible at least to suggest that this case, if stronger, is not conclusive. 
Remarkably in my judgment, the “regulatory agenda” aspect of Executive Order 12866, derived
from an earlier order of President Reagan,  appears to have received  little attention from OIRA and176
has attracted few comments in the literature.  Its principal benefit may well have been enhancement
of agency heads’ control of their staff, by creating an annual need to discuss and rationalize
regulatory work planned for future effort.  In putting together a draft regulatory agenda, as in
developing an annual budget, the agency head would be required to confront at an early stage
competing views about priorities for her agency and to rationalize them.   While both Executive177
Orders suggest the possibility that elements of proposed agendas might be centrally disapproved (and
hence never undertaken), one has encountered little indication that OIRA in facts so administers the
order.  Its attention, and the attention of other elements in the White House, has predominantly been
retrospective.178
Given the absence of distinguishing procedures, the connection of agency priorities as a general
matter to the President’s program, and the ordinary opacity even of agency judgments about such
matters, here one might find considerably greater room for the presumption of directorial authority
for which Dean Kagan and others argue.  Even here, however, it remains a question whether
Congress has given instructions constrain that authority.  Opinions generally favoring executive
authority have been quite careful to differentiate between case-by-case prioritization, and an
enforcement judgment so strong as to amount to general refusal to execute a valid statute.   179
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Moreover, even when one moves to case-by-case prioritization, the very fact of the granular
nature of such decisionmaking, in a government of immense breadth and scope, argues at the least
for readiness to accept the subordination of direct control from the very top.  Such, recall, was
Attorney General Taney’s judgment in much less complicated times.   One remembers Richard180
Nixon’s “enemies list” of tax audit subjects, that became prominent in considering his impeachment;
in most developed legal systems, prosecution is a professional calling, and its political control is a
scandal, not a central pillar of constitutional arrangements.  When Congress places the award of
research contracts deep inside a government department, to be made under standards suggesting
appropriate concerns with scientific worth and integrity, it is easy to understand the President’s role
in assuring the “faithful execution” of the laws as being to see to it that that is how they are made
– following rigorous analyses of prospective scientific worth – and as excluding interference by him
or his immediate assistants to secure favorable consideration of friends, or disapproval of projects
he finds politically unattractive.  So too for the award of contracts, and the myriad of other judgments
daily made by government bureaucrats operating under laws that presume that all is not politics, that
there is a positive role for law.
Conclusion
Our Constitution explicitly gives us a unitary head of state, but it leaves the framework of
government almost completely to congressional design.  If its text chooses between President as
overseer of the resulting assemblage, and President as necessarily entitled “decider,” the implicit
message is that of oversight, not decision.  Congress’s arrangements of government are a part of the
law that the President is to assure will “be faithfully executed,” and the text anticipates that those
arrangements will place “duties” elsewhere in the executive branch it defines.  The size and ambition
of contemporary government, in a country dedicated to the rule of law and resolute to defend itself
against unchecked individual power, point the same direction.  Congress can, to be sure, give the
President decisional authority, and it has sometimes done so.  In limited contexts – foreign relations,
military affairs, coordination of arguably conflicting mandates – the argument for inherent
presidential decisional authority is stronger.  But in the ordinary world of domestic administration
responsibilities that Congress has delegated to a particular governmental actor it has created, that
delegation is a part of the law whose faithful execution the President is to assure.  Oversight, and not
decision, is his responsibility.
